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CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF LEGISLATION
DENYING TAX-EXEMPT
STATUS TO RACIALLY
DISCRIMINATORY
SCHOOLS
EILEEN M. HANRAHAN, ESQUIRE
Two of the arguments asserted against the proposed legislation to
amend section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code are that the legis-
lation violates the establishment and free exercise clauses of the
Constitution.
The Establishment Clause
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,' the Court established a three-part test to
determine whether legislation violates the establishment clause: (1) a
statute must have a "secular legislative purpose"; (2) it must have a pri-
mary effect "that neither advances nor inhibits religion"; and, (3) it must
not foster "excessive government entanglement with religion. '
The proposed legislation has a valid secular purpose in that it seeks
to eliminate racial discrimination and to terminate governmental aid to
institutions that racially discriminate. Thus, the proposal apparently is
valid under the first part of the Lemon test.
It is argued that the proposed legislation is invalid under the second
part of the Lemon test-that a statute must have a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion-because it penalizes religions
whose practices include racial discrimination, and preferentially treats re-
ligions whose practices do not include racial discrimination. An examina-
tion of various establishment clause cases reveals that the following fac-
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Id. at 612-13.
28 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1983
tors have been important in determining whether a statute is
unconstitutional under the second part of the Lemon test: (1) whether
the statute provided for aid to a generalized class of recipients or primar-
ily to recipients of a sectarian nature; (2) whether the statute provided for
aid to the secular or sectarian mission of the school; and, (3) whether the
statute provided for benefits that were direct, or only indirect and
incidental.'
In examining the first of these factors, it would appear that the stat-
ute neither aids nor hinders a class consisting of primarily sectarian insti-
tutions. The legislation addresses the entire class of 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions. Regulations promulgated pursuant to the legislation would affect
all 501(c)(3) organizations that maintain schools. The burden of exclusion
from tax-exempt status falls equally upon all organizations, religious and
nonreligious, whose schools have racially discriminatory policies, regard-
less of the nature of the beliefs on which such policies are grounded. The
primary effect is to burden a broad class of organizations, only some of
which are religious.
Second, it is questionable whether the proposed legislation benefits
or inhibits the sectarian, as contrasted with the secular, nature of the reli-
gious school. The Supreme Court has already upheld as nonviolative of
the establishment clause, a property tax exemption for houses of worship"
and state payment of bus fares of children to and from religious schools.5
In so holding, the Supreme Court conceded that religious schools would
be benefited by the statutes at issue, but perceived the benefits as not
intimately tied to the sectarian nature of the religious school.e The Su-
preme Court has also approved, in dictum, statutes providing police and
fire protection, school lunches, health facilities, crossing guards, and high-
ways to religious institutions, as statutes of general applicability enacted
for a secular purpose.'
The proposed legislation is similarly a statute of general applicabil-
ity. It will burden, through the denial of the tax exemption, both the sec-
tarian and secular aspects of the religious institution. However, in much
the same way that generalized advancement of a religious institution, in
common with other institutions, did not establish a primary effect to ad-
vance religion, it would seem that a generalized inhibition of religious in-
3 See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366-72 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 780-89 (1973); Levitt v. Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 480-81 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
687-88 (1971); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-18 (1947).
' Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970).
6 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
' 397 U.S. at 675; 330 U.S. at 18.
I See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 746-47 (1976); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671-72 (1970); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
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stitutions, in common with others, would not establish a primary effect to
inhibit religion.
It is argued that rather than simply benefiting or inhibiting all reli-
gions, this legislation, unlike legislation that the Court has approved, se-
lectively benefits some religions and disadvantages others. It is argued
that such different treatment is preferential treatment of some religions.
The short answer to this argument is that a statute of general applicabil-
ity, secular in purpose, does not violate the establishment clause simply
because it encourages or discourages, requires or prohibits activity in ac-
cordance with the tenets of some religions and contrary to the tenets of
others.*
In McGowan v. Maryland,9 the Court upheld Sunday closing laws, as
applied to Jewish merchants.10 In Gillette v. United States," the Court
upheld a conscientious objector status for persons who for religious rea-
sons conscientiously opposed all wars, but denied such status to those
who for religious reasons opposed only some wars." Finally, the Court, in
Harris v. McRae,"3 held that merely because abortion regulation coincides
with the tenets of the Roman Catholic religion does not mean that the
establishment clause has been violated."
In all these cases, the different treatment of religion that resulted
from a neutrally applied secular statute was not the preferential treat-
ment of religion, but rather a disparate impact upon religion. The same is
true of the proposed legislation. It does not unconstitutionally distinguish
between religious organizations as such; it distinguishes between discrimi-
natory and nondiscriminatory organizations. Thus, the Court would prob-
ably find that the primary effect of the statute is neither to advance nor
to inhibit religion.
Finally, the Court has identified a third test that a statute must pass
to be found consistent with the establishment clause: the statute must
not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. The Court,
in Lemon, cited what it termed the "classic warning" of "certain pro-
grams, whose very nature, is apt to entangle the state in details and ad-
ministration and planning."'" The test is one of degree.' 6 The Court has
8 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448
(1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
" 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
10 Id. at 427-28.
11 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
" Id. at 448-55.
13 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
11 Id. at 319-20.
15 403 U.S. at 615 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
1 397 U.S. at 674.
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found excessive government entanglement where the grant of government
aid to a religious school necessitated government monitoring and inquiry
to ensure that the government aid was confined to a secular use by the
school.1 7 The Court consistently either has failed to find or has not in-
quired into excessive entanglement when the aid provided by the govern-
ment was itself secular in nature and would not require any government
surveillance, monitoring or auditing to ensure secular use."8
Some contend that the legislation would invite excessive government
involvement with religious schools. The Court could reasonably conclude,
however, that the proposed legislation permits the drafting of regulations
limiting government involvement to constitutionally permissible levels
and does not, on its face, inevitably call for the kind of government super-
vision and inspection found to have constituted excessive involvement in
the past.
In conclusion, while it seems clear that the proposed legislation does
have a secular purpose, predicting results under the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test is more difficult.
The Free Exercise Clause
The question with respect to the free exercise clause concerns
whether the denial of a tax exemption on account of religiously based,
racially discriminatory policies violates the right to free exercise of reli-
gion of the discriminatory private school. The case law in this area has
established that courts must consider the following three questions: (1) Is
the right to free exercise of religion at stake?; (2) If so, does the legisla-
tion burden that right?; (3) If so, is the burden nevertheless justified by a
compelling governmental interest that cannot be advanced by less restric-
tive means? 19
Although the Court will not examine the reasonableness or validity of
a religious belief, the school at the outset must, of course, demonstrate
that its racially discriminatory policies are religiously based in order to
present the free exercise claim.2" The Court then must determine whether
a burden on the right of free exercise exists. The Court has found direct
burdens on the free exercise of religion where a person was compelled to
' New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 128-30 (1977); Wolman v. Walter, 433
U.S. 229, 254-55 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 617-19 (1971).
"8 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 654 (1980);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1977); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687
(1971).
" Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
213-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-09 (1963).
"0 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972).
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act in violation of his religious beliefs or prohibited from acting in accor-
dance with his religious beliefs. Direct burdens on religion existed where
the Amish were compelled to pay social security taxes"' and to send their
children through formal schooling beyond the eighth grade,22 where
Mormons were prohibited from practicing polygamy, 2 and where chil-
dren who were Jehovah's Witnesses were prohibited from distributing re-
ligious literature on the street.2'
In Braunfeld v. Brown,25 the Court described an "indirect" burden
on free exercise as "legislation which does not make unlawful the religious
practice itself.216 The Court stated that statutes imposing an indirect eco-
nomic burden on religion were "nearly limitless. 2 72 The Court has found
economic burdens on free exercise of religion where a person was forced
to choose between following the precepts of religion and forfeiting bene-
fits or abandoning one of the precepts of religion to receive economic ben-
efits.2 In Braunfeld, the burden consisted of the economic disadvantage
suffered by Jewish merchants as a result of Sunday closing laws.2 9 The
Court has also found economic burdens where persons who refused to
work for religious reasons were denied unemployment compensation. 0
The Court plainly has rejected the argument that because a tax bene-
fit is a right or privilege, a party cannot complain that there is burden
when it is denied a benefit to which it had no right in the first place. The
Court stated: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberty of religion
and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions
upon a benefit or privilege."'" It would seem then that the denial of the
tax exemption would be a burden on the right of free exercise of religion
because the economic benefit is conditioned upon the forfeiture of a reli-
gious practice. The degree of burden can be determined only on a case by
case basis.
Once a burden on free exercise is established, the Court must ex-
amine the government interest at stake to determine if the burden on
religion is justified by a compelling governmental interest that cannot be
,1 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
22 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
,1 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878).
24 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944).
2- 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
2 Id. at 606.
27 Id.
"8 See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
404 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
2' 366 U.S. at 601.
0 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963).
31 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
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advanced by less restrictive means.3 2 The government interests in denying
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools are to eliminate ra-
cial discrimination and any indirect government benefits to, or association
with, racially discriminatory practices. These interests traditionally have
been regarded as of the highest order.33
Although the Supreme Court has never considered the question
whether a burden on free exercise of religion is outweighed by the govern-
ment interest concerning racial discrimination, free exercise cases previ-
ously before the Court are instructive. In Reynolds v. United States,3 the
Court upheld the prohibition of polygamy as applied to Mormons, citing
longstanding national policy. 5 The Court, in Prince v. Massachusetts,36
upheld the prohibition of distribution of religious literature by children
who were Jehovah's Witnesses, citing the state's great interest as parens
patriae.3 ' In Braunfeld,38 the Court upheld: Sunday closing laws as ap-
plied to Jewish merchants, citing the state's important interest in a uni-
form day of rest.3 9 Finally, in United States v. Lee,40 the Court upheld
mandatory contribution to the Social Security system by the Amish, cit-
ing a high interest in the effective functioning of the tax system."1 Thus,
the Court has upheld both direct and indirect burdens on religion, citing
compelling state interests.
In other cases, the Court has struck down statutes that burdened re-
ligion because either the state interest was not compelling or because the
burdensome statute was unnecessary to achieve the state interest. Thus,
in Wisconsin v. Yoder,'42 the Court struck down a statute compelling
schooling beyond the eighth grade as applied to the Amish, stating that
the contribution of the statute to the state's interest in preparing children
for the duties of citizenship was speculative and that the Amish, in any
event, educated their children themselves and had already demonstrated
their good citizenship."3 In Sherbert v. Verner44 and Thomas v. Review
32 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
3 See Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Jan-
uary 18, 1982); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976); Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 420-22 (1968); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1948);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1995, 2000a to 2000e-6 (1976).
31 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
1 Id. at 166.
- 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
37 Id. at 166.
- 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
39 Id. at 607.
40 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
" Id. at 258-59.
41 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
'3 Id. at 234-36.
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Board,'48 the Court struck down the denial of unemployment compensa-
tion to persons who refused employment on religious grounds, finding the
state interest in either case to be unsupported by the evidence. 46
The principle to be gleaned from an overall analysis of these cases is
that a burden on the free exercise of religion will be upheld when the
state advances a compelling interest that cannot be advanced by less re-
strictive means. The Court has upheld even direct burdens on religion so
long as the state advanced a compelling interest. Here, the government
interest in eliminating discrimination and indirect government benefits to
discrimination is compelling. The proposed legislation is probably a nec-
essary means to realize that interest.
In those cases where the Court has struck down the state statutes,
not only was the state interest found to be either insubstantial or not
compelling, but the burden on religion was severe. It is questionable
whether the burden of the denial of a tax exemption on the school with
religiously based, racially discriminatory policies rises to the level of bur-
den found in cases where the Court has sustained the free religious belief
as in Yoder, and the denial of unemployment compensation to a private
individual as in Sherbert and Thomas.
Balancing competing interests is a precarious and difficult task. The
Court, however, reasonably could conclude that neither of the elements
found in cases where the free exercise right has been upheld exists here,
and on that basis sustain the legislation.
Finally, it should be noted that arguments of unconstitutionality of
the proposed legislation have been raised on the basis of the right of free-
dom of association17 and the right of parents to raise and educate chil-
dren.4" Such arguments are significantly less formidable than arguments
based on religious rights, and probably would not support a finding of
unconstitutionality. 49
44 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
45 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
41 450 U.S. at 720; 374 U.S. at 403-04.
47 See NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 300-09 (1964).
48 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 165-66 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
41 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455,
470 (1973).
